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The State defends a law very different from the one Florida actually enacted.  
The Act does not regulate the “conduct” of “common carriers” or impose only 
“incidental” burdens on speech.  It overrides online services’ protected editorial 
judgments, interfering with the messages those judgments express and making the 
State the ultimate arbiter of private companies’ speech.  Florida cannot mandate such 
“enforced access”—even in the name of “enhanc[ing]” speech, promoting 
“fairness,” or addressing supposedly “vast accumulations of unreviewable power in 
the modern media empires.”  Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 245, 
250-51 (1974).  Technology changes, but the First Amendment endures.  The Act 
should be enjoined. 
I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS. 
A. The State Cannot Evade Strict Scrutiny.  
Defendants do not seriously dispute that the Act’s core provisions are content-
based.  Nor do they dispute that the Act singles out particular speakers for burdens 
while privileging others.  These features alone warrant strict scrutiny (PI 23-32), and 
Defendants’ efforts to evade that standard fail. 
Editorial Judgments Are Protected Speech.  Defendants are wrong in 
suggesting that the only speech implicated here is that of the online services’ users.  
Opp. 18-19, 22-23.  The First Amendment limits government, not private actors, and 
Florida is restricting the services’ protected speech—their editorial judgments about 
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whether and how to display user content.  PI 21-23.  “[P]resentation of an edited 
compilation of speech generated by other persons … fall[s] squarely within the core 
of First Amendment security.”  Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 
515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995).  It is those editorial judgments that the Act not only 
burdens, but flatly proscribes. 
The State is equally wrong in claiming that the Act regulates conduct, not 
speech.  Opp. 30-31.  “Labeling certain … communications ‘speech’ and others 
‘conduct’ is unprincipled and susceptible to manipulation.”  Otto v. City of Boca 
Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 865 (11th Cir. 2020).  That is especially so here, where the 
editorial functions have long been recognized as speech, and the Act both prohibits 
posting addenda and compels sweeping disclosures.  “Both on its face and in its 
practical operation, [Florida’s] law imposes a burden based on the content of speech 
and the identity of the speaker.”  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 
(2011). 
Enforcing standards about subjects like hate speech, pornography, or 
disinformation expresses a message about the nature of the online community and 
what its moderator finds objectionable.  No additional speech is needed for such 
expression to be protected.  Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort 
Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1243-45 (11th Cir. 2018).  That such editorial judgments 
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may take place behind the scenes (Opp. 31) is irrelevant—just as it is when 
newspapers reject op-eds. 
It is also untrue that only “highly selective” newspapers or “parades” 
expressing a “common theme” enjoy constitutional protection.  Opp. 21-23.  “[A] 
private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining 
multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message.”  
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70.  Newspaper op-ed pages, for example, have no 
“common theme”—they collect disparate perspectives.  Similarly, that some online 
services choose to host a wide range of views and topics is no basis for curtailing 
their First Amendment rights.  That choice itself embodies a protected editorial 
judgment; making it does not forfeit the right to rule certain speech off-limits or to 
prioritize some messages over others.  A contrary rule would encourage online 
services to allow less speech, not more. 
PruneYard and FAIR Are Not On Point.  Defendants’ reliance on 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), and Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 
U.S. 47 (2006), is misplaced.  TechFreedom Br. 21-24. 
PruneYard arose from a California case holding that the public had a state-
law right to engage in “petitioning, reasonably exercised” in a shopping mall that 
prohibited “any publicly expressive activity … not directly related to its commercial 
purposes.”  Id. at 77-78.  But the mall was nothing like a “social media platform.”  
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It did not host speech, transmit speech, or make editorial judgments; it was a place 
to buy goods.  That is why “intrusion[s] into the function of editors” were “not 
present.”  Id. at 88.  Later cases confirm the point: “Notably absent from PruneYard 
was any concern that access to this area might affect the shopping center owner’s 
exercise of his own right to speak: the owner did not even allege that he objected to 
the content of the pamphlets; nor was the access right content based.”  Pac. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. CPUC, 475 U.S. 1, 12 (1986); accord Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579-80.  The 
Act, by contrast, is a textbook example of how forced hosting of objectionable 
content burdens protected editorial decisions. 
Defendants note the public was unlikely to attribute the leafletters’ beliefs to 
the mall’s owner in PruneYard.  447 U.S. at 87.  This case is different.  Fairly or 
unfairly, people view Plaintiffs’ members as approving of the content they host.  
Szabo ¶¶8-11, 14-15.  Indeed, the idea that those companies’ editorial choices reflect 
disagreement with excluded viewpoints was the Governor’s stated justification for 
signing S.B. 7072.  PI 9.  And such associations are all the more likely under the 
Act, which hobbles services’ ability to post disclaimers.  Cf. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 
87 (mall owner could “expressly disavow any connection with the message”).   
Similarly, FAIR had nothing to do with editorial judgments.  The “equal 
access” law there—unlike the content- and speaker-based law here—simply 
required schools to allow any military employers to recruit on campus.  As the Court 
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explained, “accommodating the military’s message does not affect the law schools’ 
speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and 
recruiting receptions.”  547 U.S. at 64.  But online services are engaged in protected 
speech when they make editorial judgments, and the Act restricts those judgments.  
Congress itself has acknowledged the special nature of those judgments in Section 
230—and it is not surprising that there is no equivalent of that protection for law 
schools or shopping malls.    
Turner Confirms Strict Scrutiny Is Required.  Turner Broadcasting Systems 
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), does not lower the applicable scrutiny standard.  
Turner applied intermediate scrutiny because the challenged “must-carry” rules 
were neither content-based nor “designed to favor or disadvantage speech of any 
particular content.”  Id. at 642-52.  The Act is both.  PI 24-29.  The State’s claim that 
the Act has a content-neutral purpose is both irrelevant and untrue.  Irrelevant 
because Reed (which the State ignores) holds that a “law that is content based on its 
face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, 
content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas’ contained in the 
regulated speech.”  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165-66 (2015).  Untrue 
because the Act was designed to punish the targeted services for the perceived 
content of their editorial decision-making.  PI 9-10, 29-32.  The State cannot shrug 
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off the Governor’s signing statement, Opp. 42-43, and has no meaningful defense 
for the Act’s carveout for theme-park owners, id. n.7. 
Turner also turned on cable operators’ unique physical attributes—the 
“bottleneck” control they exercised over programming.  515 U.S. at 656.  “[S]imply 
by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for cable speech, a cable operator 
[could] prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to programming it chooses to 
exclude.”  Id.  Not so with “social media platforms.”  While their editorial decisions 
may impact what content can be viewed on their own services, they cannot prevent 
end-users from accessing content from countless other online and traditional media 
outlets.  Defendants’ argument about “vast economic power” (Opp. 33) misses the 
point of Turner.  Online services “lack the physical power to silence anyone’s voices, 
no matter what their alleged market shares may be.”  Zhang v. Baidu.com, 10 F. 
Supp. 3d 433, 437, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
Finally, the must-carry provisions in Turner were “not activated by any 
particular message spoken by cable operators” and did not cause them to “conclude 
that the safe course is to avoid controversy.”  512 U.S. at 654-55.  But the Act’s 
restrictions are triggered precisely by service providers’ editorial speech—
discouraging them from making potentially controversial judgments.   
The “Common Carrier” Theory Fails.  Nor can Defendants circumvent the 
First Amendment by positing that “social media platforms” are “akin to common 
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carriers,” Opp. 24 (emphasis added) (quoting Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at 
Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1224 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring)), or “should 
be treated similarly to common carriers,” Act § 1(6) (emphasis added).  Under settled 
law, these companies are nothing like “common carriers”—and Defendants cannot 
avoid the First Amendment problem by labeling them as such.  
“[I]t is the practice of [providing] indifferent service that confers common 
carrier status.”  Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976); Opp. 25.  “A common carrier does not ‘make individualized decisions, 
in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal.’”  FCC v. Midwest Video 
Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979).  Plaintiffs’ members, however, have never been 
“indifferent” about which speakers they host or how third-party speech is presented 
on their platforms.  PI 5-8.  Nor do they merely “distribut[e] the speech of the broader 
public.”  Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1224 (Thomas, J.).  Rather, they make individualized, 
context-specific judgments about what users and content are permitted under their 
policies.  Congress recognized as much in Section 230, and Florida cannot ignore 
that these companies bear no resemblance to conduits that carry all comers without 
regard to content.  PI 36-37.  Nor is the Act anything like common-carrier regulation: 
instead of requiring nondiscrimination, it exempts favored speakers from the rules 
that apply to everyone else. 
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Regardless, labeling Plaintiffs’ members “common carriers” cannot deprive 
them of their “right to be free from state regulation that burdens [their] speech.”  
PG&E, 475 U.S. at 17-18 & n.14 (addressing “a regulated utility”).  As Justice 
Thomas himself has recognized: “Labeling [access requirements] a common carrier 
scheme has no real First Amendment consequences.  It simply does not follow from 
common carrier status that cable operators may not, with Congress’ blessing, decline 
to carry indecent speech on their leased access channels.”  Denver Area Educ. 
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 824-26 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
B. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny. 
Because Defendants do not argue that the Act satisfies strict scrutiny, the 
Court need go no further.  But even under intermediate scrutiny, Defendants cannot 
show that the Act advances a “substantial” interest “unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression,” or that its restrictions on speech are “no greater than is essential” 
to furthering that interest.  Turner, 512 U.S. at 662.1   
 
1 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (Opp. n.1), applies 
“more deferential review to some laws that require professionals to disclose factual, 
noncontroversial information” where the disclosure is not “unjustified or unduly 
burdensome.”  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2372 (2018) (“NIFLA”).  Like those invalidated in NIFLA, the Act’s onerous 
disclosure provisions go well beyond simple factual disclosures; they demand 
“precise and thorough explanation[s]” of editorial decisions and disclosure of 
proprietary information.  Id. at 2372, 2377-78. 
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i. The Act Does Not Advance Any Substantial Interest. 
 “Multiplicity of Information Sources.”  While the State claims that the Act 
advances “values central to the First Amendment” (Opp. 34-35), it fails to identify 
any case where a comparable private party was subjected to constraints that the First 
Amendment imposes on the government.  PI 33.   
The State also ignores Tornillo.  There, Florida defended an enforced-access 
law on the theory that the “First Amendment interest of the public in being informed” 
was “in peril because the ‘marketplace of ideas’” was “a monopoly controlled by the 
owners of the market.”  418 U.S. at 250-51.  The Court unanimously disagreed that 
this allowed Florida to compel newspapers “to publish that which ‘reason’ tells them 
should not be published.”  Id. at 256.  Similarly here, supposedly promoting access 
to “a multiplicity of information sources” (Opp. 34-35) cannot justify restricting 
private speech.   
“Unfair Practices.”  Nor can Defendants recast the Act as protecting against 
“unfair or deceptive acts.”  Opp. 35-43.  The Act is not a fraud regulation: instead, 
it purports to dictate that editorial judgments must be “consistent” and “fair.”  But 
the “very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction [could] be used to produce 
thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on 
the First Amendment.”  Hurley, 515 U.S at 579.  Defendants’ reliance on cherry-
picked anecdotes of supposedly inconsistent or misguided editorial decisions only 
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underscores that such judgments are often complex and normative, with no objective 
“right” answer.  The State has no legitimate interest in “correct[ing]” subjective 
judgments based on a “difference of opinion.”  Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 579.  
Protecting Candidates and Journalists.  Defendants do not even try to explain 
how the candidate provisions promote “the integrity of elections.”  Opp. 41-42.  
Moreover, the provisions work in a plainly improper way—by elevating the 
supposed right of candidates (and those speaking about candidates) above the 
services’ right to enforce their editorial rules.  The Supreme Court has “repeatedly 
rejected the argument that the government has a compelling state interest in ‘leveling 
the playing field’ that can justify undue burdens on political speech.”  Arizona Free 
Enter. Club v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 749-50 (2021). 
Likewise, the State’s only defense of the “journalistic enterprise” provisions 
is that, without them, “the platforms could endlessly cast these entities’ content as 
against the platforms’ guidelines.”  Opp. 45.  But this too merely highlights that the 
Act impairs the services’ right to enforce their editorial standards.  That approach—
“restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others”—is “wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”  Bennett, 564 
U.S. at 741-42. 
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ii. The Act Lacks Any Tailoring.  
Even if Defendants could identify some important interest unrelated to 
suppressing speech, there is a fundamental “disconnect between [the Act’s] stated 
purpose and its actual scope.”  NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2376.  That is true of not just 
particular provisions, but the Act as a whole, which proscribes a massive amount of 
speech, subjects billions of editorial judgments to liability, “imposes an unduly 
burdensome disclosure requirement that will chill … speech,” and is “wildly 
underinclusive.”  Id. at 2375, 2378; PI 30-31, 38-41.  
Defendants offer no evidence that the Act’s blunderbuss restrictions will 
actually advance its asserted interests “in a direct and material way.”  Turner, 512 
U.S. at 664; accord Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 1314 (11th Cir. 
2017) (courts “may not … discover new evidence … that might support” speech-
restrictive law).  They cannot explain why the State must ban all “deplatforming” of 
candidates (and algorithmic sorting of candidate material), ban all “censorship” of 
non-obscene journalistic content, or require the same burdensome notice for all 
editorial decisions.  These provisions plainly “burden substantially more speech than 
is necessary to further” any purported state interest.  Turner, 512 U.S. at 665.  Nor 
have Defendants explained why Florida’s existing consumer protection laws are 
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insufficient.  Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1314.2  “Broad prophylactic rules in the 
area of free expression are suspect”; the Act lacks the “precision of regulation” the 
First Amendment demands.  NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
C. The Act’s Vagueness Exacerbates the Burden on Speech.  
Defendants claim that the Act’s consistency requirement is sufficiently clear 
because it “requires only that social media platforms adhere to their own announced 
content moderation standards.”  Opp. 47.  This interpretation is unsupported by the 
Act’s text, but regardless, it cannot cure the vagueness problem.  Defendants claim 
that online services can make any “‘educational, scientific, or artistic evaluations,’ 
…  they choose so long as they do so ‘in a consistent manner.’”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  That does nothing to answer the endless questions raised by this provision.  
PI 42-43.  Plaintiffs’ members invest great effort in applying their policies fairly and 
rationally, but what the State will deem sufficiently “consistent” on such inherently 
normative questions is anyone’s guess. 
Defendants only highlight the First Amendment problem.  Requiring private 
moderators to “publish” their editorial standards—and then using that compelled 
speech to override their subjective, value-laden judgments and penalize companies 
 
2 Similarly for the Act’s antitrust provisions, the State has neither shown that its 
existing antitrust laws are insufficient nor justified treating the covered entities 
differently from other entities.  PI 30. 
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for supposedly “misinterpreting” their own rules—is itself an unconstitutional 
restriction on editorial speech.  Internet Ass’n Br. 11-13.   
D. The Act is Preempted by Section 230. 
While invoking constitutional avoidance (Opp. 3), the State’s approach does 
not avoid the constitutional issue:  It uses the same supposed constitutional concerns 
to urge a “narrow” reading of Section 230.  Opp. 11.  But there is no escaping the 
conflict between the Act and Section 230.   
Citing Section 230(c)(2)(A)’s “good faith” language, Defendants say the Act 
simply bars “bad faith” judgments.  Opp. 9-10.  Yet the Act’s sweeping rules for 
candidates and journalistic enterprises and insistence on “consistent” decisions apply 
regardless of intent, purpose, or state of mind.  And inconsistency is not the same as 
bad faith.  PI 48.  Defendants also argue that Section 230(c)(1), which contains no 
good faith limitation, is inapplicable.  But courts have applied that provision to a 
wide range of editorial judgments (PI. 47-48), and recent cases squarely reject the 
State’s crabbed reading.  E.g., Murphy v. Twitter, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 5th 12, 33 n.9 
(2021).  Justice Thomas’ observations (Opp. 5-7)—in a case where this issue was 
neither presented nor briefed—are no answer to this wealth of precedents. 
Finally, the notion that Section 230 might somehow transform private services 
into state actors (Opp. 11-13) is baseless.  Divino Grp. LLC v. Google LLC, 2021 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3245, at *15-22 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2021) (rejecting same argument 
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because Section 230 “does not require private entities to do anything”).  Section 230 
codifies online services’ First Amendment rights to engage in “private blocking and 
screening of offensive material.”  PI 45-46.  Congress’s recognition of those rights 
cannot be used to save the very state regulations that federal law—and the First 
Amendment itself—prohibit. 
II. THE EQUITABLE FACTORS FAVOR AN INJUNCTION.  
The State insists its “infringement on platforms’ rights is exceedingly small” 
(Opp. 51), ignoring both (1) the per se irreparable harm resulting from any First 
Amendment violation, and (2) detailed evidence of chilled speech, compliance costs, 
and reputational harm in Plaintiffs’ declarations.  PI 49-50.  The legislature’s 
decision to carve out a small group of favored entities underscores that these harms 
are real.  And despite having held legislative hearings, the State offers no contrary 
evidence, or evidence of genuine harm to its interests, from a preliminary injunction. 
Defendants’ attempts to dismiss the Act’s grave public-interest harms are 
equally unconvincing.  Defendants never meaningfully dispute that this law will 
open the floodgates to all kinds of objectionable and unlawful content.  PI 45-49, 
52-53; Chamber of Progress Amicus Br. x-xxiv. 
Finally, because the Act’s defective definitions govern the entire statute, 
which singles out particular media entities, the State cannot request to sever and 
“save” certain provisions.  E.g., Vigue v. Shoar, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1230 (M.D. 
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Fla. 2020) (severability unavailable where “the unconstitutional provision is the crux 
of the statute”).  Root and branch, the Act is unconstitutional.  
LOCAL RULE 7.1(F) CERTIFICATION 
Counsel for Plaintiffs certifies that the above Reply contains 3,199 words, not 
including the Table of Contents and Table of Authorities. 
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Email: peter.karanjia@dlapiper.com 
 jim.halpert@dlapiper.com 




Douglas L. Kilby 
Florida Bar No. 0073407 
Glenn Burhans, Jr.  
Florida Bar No. 0605867  
Bridget Smitha  
Florida Bar No. 0709581  
Christopher R. Clark 
Florida Bar No. 1002388 
STEARNS WEAVER MILLER 
WEISSLER ALHADEFF & 
SITTERSON, P.A. 
Highpoint Center  
106 East College Avenue, Suite 700  
Tallahassee, FL 32301  





Ilana H. Eisenstein (admitted pro hac 
vice) 
Ben C. Fabens-Lassen (admitted pro hac 
vice) 
Danielle T. Morrison (admitted pro hac 
vice) 
Jonathan Green (admitted pro hac vice) 
DLA PIPER LLP (US) 
One Liberty Place 
1650 Market Street, Suite 5000 
Philadelphia, PA  19103-7300 
Phone:  215-656-3300 








Attorneys for Plaintiff  
Computer & Communications Industry 
Association 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on June 24, 2021, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System.  I also 
certify that the foregoing document is being served this day via electronic mail on 
all parties listed on the attached Service List. 
 
/s/ Christopher G. Oprison    
Attorney 
  





Blaine H. Winship 
Glenn A. Bassett 
Daniel W. Bell 
Office of the Florida Attorney General 
The Capitol 
400 S Monroe St., Ste PL-01 
Tallahassee, FL 32399-6536 
Phone:  850-414-3300 






Counsel for Defendants Ashley B. Moody, in her official capacity as Florida 
Attorney General, and for Joni Alexis Poitier, Jason Todd Allen, John Martin Hayes, 
and Kymberlee Curry Smith, in their official capacities as Commissioners of the 
Florida Elections Commission 
 
Brian W. Barnes (admitted pro hac vice) 
Charles J. Cooper 
David H. Thompson 
Joseph O. Masterman 
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC 
1523 New Hampshire Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC  20036 
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James W. Uthmeier 
Raymond F. Treadwell 
Executive Office of Governor Ron DeSantis 
Office of the General Counsel 
The Capitol, PL-05 
Tallahassee, FL  32399 




Counsel for Defendant Patrick Gillespie, in his official capacity as Deputy Secretary 
of Business Operations, Florida Department of Management Services 
 
Lawrence G. Walters 
WALTERS LAW GROUP 
195 W. Pine Avenue 
Longwood, FL 32750 




Berin M. Szoka (admitted pro hac vice) 
TechFreedom 
110 Maryland Ave. NE, Suite 205 
Washington, DC 20002 
Phone:  202-803-2867 
Email:mail@techfreedom.org 




1900 M Street NW, Suite 250 
Washington, DC 20036 
Phone: 202-296-3585 
Fax:  202-706-5298 
Email:nury@zwillgen.com 
Counsel for Chamber of Progress, Connected Commerce Council, CTA Engine 
Advocacy, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, National Black 
Justice Coalition, Progressive Policy Institute, TechNet, Washington Center for 
Technology Policy Inclusion 




Christopher B. Hopkins 
McDONALD HOPKINS LLC 
505 S. Flagler Drive, Suite 300 





Aaron Mackey (admitted pro hac vice) 
David Greene (admitted pro hac vice) 
Kurt Opsahl (admitted pro hac vice) 
Electronic Frontier Foundation 
815 Eddy Street 






Counsel for Electronic Frontier Foundation and Protect Democracy Project, Inc. 
 
Deanna K. Shullman 
SHULLMAN FUGATE PLLC 
2101 Vista Parkway 
Suite 4006 
West Palm Beach, FL  33411 
Phone: 561-429-3619 
Email:dshullman@shullmanfulgate.com 
Counsel for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, American Civil 
Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Authors Guild Inc., 
Center for Democracy and Technology, Media Law Resource Center, Inc. and Pen 
American Center, Inc. 
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Peter W. Homer 
HOMER BONNER 
1200 Four Seasons Tower 
1441 Brickell Avenue 
Miami, FL  33131 
Phone: 305-350-5139 
Fax:  305-372-2738 
Email:phomer@homerbonner.com 
-and- 
Paul R.Q. Wolfson (admitted pro hac vice) 
Patrick J. Carome (admitted pro hac vice) 
Ari Holtzblatt (admitted pro hac vice) 
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING 
HALE AND DORR LLP 
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC  20006 
Phone: 202-663-6000 (main) 
  202-633-6390 (Wolfson/Holtzblatt) 




Counsel for Internet Association 
 
Leonid Goldstein Pro Se 
4400 Troup Hwy., Apt. 508 
Tyler, TX  75703 
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